OnlyBucs

4B49535543260 wrote: In theory at least, they watch those stats on-going and presumably update the shifts according to situation. I say 'in theory' for obvious reasons. I don't mind the shifts as much as I mind the 'infield in' strategy (which I guess is a defensive shift also). McClendon (I think it was) used to drive me crazy. He'd seen the stat that the team to score first won some large percentage of the time, so would move the infield in even if it was the first inning. To me, that shift is really a last ditch effort to save a game otherwise clearly lost.


Makes you wonder why so many managers use that strategy? It is said that hitters' average increase .100 points with the infield in. I would love to see a breakdown of that stat. I think a few times (I recall twice) the Pirates had the infield in and got their groundball and an out, then the next batter got the hit to score that run. So, in the long run it still didn't prevent the run.

103D30212637206063520 wrote: In theory at least, they watch those stats on-going and presumably update the shifts according to situation. I say 'in theory' for obvious reasons. I don't mind the shifts as much as I mind the 'infield in' strategy (which I guess is a defensive shift also). McClendon (I think it was) used to drive me crazy. He'd seen the stat that the team to score first won some large percentage of the time, so would move the infield in even if it was the first inning. To me, that shift is really a last ditch effort to save a game otherwise clearly lost.
I always had the feeling that McClendon made moves he had seen other mgrs make without understanding why they made them.




McClendon reminded me of the movie Comrades of Summer. A Russian baseball team learning the game and the coach always did what "Man-well" said to do. The American coach finally figured out he was following the manual of baseball, a book, not an actual person.

050E060A0F0E155056211800090E0E4F020E610 wrote: In theory at least, they watch those stats on-going and presumably update the shifts according to situation. I say 'in theory' for obvious reasons. I don't mind the shifts as much as I mind the 'infield in' strategy (which I guess is a defensive shift also). McClendon (I think it was) used to drive me crazy. He'd seen the stat that the team to score first won some large percentage of the time, so would move the infield in even if it was the first inning. To me, that shift is really a last ditch effort to save a game otherwise clearly lost.


Makes you wonder why so many managers use that strategy?  It is said that hitters' average increase .100 points with the infield in.  I would love to see a breakdown of that stat.  I think a few times (I recall twice) the Pirates had the infield in and got their groundball and an out, then the next batter got the hit to score that run.  So, in the long run it still didn't prevent the run.
It's a huge gamble to play the infield in. The fielders have no time to react and no range to cover so they need the ball hit directly to them. Even a soft pop up normally routinely caught falls in behind them. So the risk is that a bigger inning can be created by making it so much easier to get a hit. But if you simply can't allow that runner from 3B to score (e.g., late in a tie game), it's a risk that must be taken. But it should never become a routine strategy with a man on 3B.

5153494F593C0 wrote: In theory at least, they watch those stats on-going and presumably update the shifts according to situation. I say 'in theory' for obvious reasons. I don't mind the shifts as much as I mind the 'infield in' strategy (which I guess is a defensive shift also). McClendon (I think it was) used to drive me crazy. He'd seen the stat that the team to score first won some large percentage of the time, so would move the infield in even if it was the first inning. To me, that shift is really a last ditch effort to save a game otherwise clearly lost.


that scored first stat is what got Leyland to sacrifice bunt in the first inning too.

092429383F2E39797A4B0 wrote: In theory at least, they watch those stats on-going and presumably update the shifts according to situation. I say 'in theory' for obvious reasons. I don't mind the shifts as much as I mind the 'infield in' strategy (which I guess is a defensive shift also). McClendon (I think it was) used to drive me crazy. He'd seen the stat that the team to score first won some large percentage of the time, so would move the infield in even if it was the first inning. To me, that shift is really a last ditch effort to save a game otherwise clearly lost.


Makes you wonder why so many managers use that strategy?  It is said that hitters' average increase .100 points with the infield in.  I would love to see a breakdown of that stat.  I think a few times (I recall twice) the Pirates had the infield in and got their groundball and an out, then the next batter got the hit to score that run.  So, in the long run it still didn't prevent the run.
It's a huge gamble to play the infield in. The fielders have no time to react and no range to cover so they need the ball hit directly to them. Even a soft pop up normally routinely caught falls in behind them. So the risk is that a bigger inning can be created by making it so much easier to get a hit. But if you simply can't allow that runner from 3B to score (e.g., late in a tie game), it's a risk that must be taken. But it should never become a routine strategy with a man on 3B.   




You rarely see pick off attempts at 3B. You rarely see a third baseman holding on a runner. This can change the lead by the runner.

4E5E5F687E7E721D0 wrote: You don't think teams in general have strategies?  You think it's always situational?



I think game plans can change, but overall I think teams have general strategies.  These are based on the talents of the players. 






Yes.  The 87 cards decided to run.  So run they did.  Team full of fast guys, who were good at basestealing, minus Jack Clark and Pena.  (maybe Tommy Herr too, I don't remember if he could run)



What are the Pirates offensive team strengths?  Baserunning? Basestealing?


The 2001 Pirates were a very poor hitting team. 2nd worst in the NL in runs scored. Worst in OBP. So Lloyd McClendon decided to institute a running strategy. He was not deterred by the fact that he didn't have the personnel for such a strategy. 1Bman Kevin Young led the team with 15 steals but was thrown out 11 times. Giles was 13 for 19 and Kendall was 13 for 27 in steals. McLendon's strategy resulted in the Pirates leading MLB with 73 caught stealings and the worst SB percentage in MLB (56%). In other words, the team that got the fewest runners on base had the most runners removed from the bases. The moral of the story is that you can't just adopt a strategy and force your personnel to fit into it. If you don't have the right personnel, all you do is make a bad situation even worse. 


Yes.  Proves my point that teams have strategies in place they try to implement no matter what.



Currently, the Pirates have a strategy of pitching inside.  They tried that with Jon Niese and it failed.  There were scouts saying it wouldn't work for Niese, they were right.  I am not sure if the Pirates went away from that strategy eventually for Niese, but what ever they did it did not work.



The Pirates stick with their shifts no matter the score or time in game.  They shift one of the highest in all of baseball which is a team strategy.




The Pirates have no plan or strategy, hence the results.  Pretty simple.


Seriously. Anything otherwise is just talk which I guess could be the Pirates strategy.

What's all the dancing around for?



Our team strategy is what? Have runners thrown out a mile on the bases regularly, when getting to the base they're trying to advance to is almost meaningless?

4D444C5D53290 wrote: What's all the dancing around for? 



Our team strategy is what?  Have runners thrown out a mile on the bases regularly, when getting to the base they're trying to advance to is almost meaningless?


How did the 1-0 game take over 3 hours to play?